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By DANIEL KAHNEMAN*
My ￿ rst exposure to the psychological as-
sumptions of economics was in a report that
Bruno Frey wrote on that subject in the early
1970’s. Its ￿ rst or second sentence stated that
the agent of economic theory is rational and
sel￿sh, and that histastesdo not change.I found
this list quite startling, because I had been pro-
fessionally trained as a psychologist not to
believe a word of it. The gap between the as-
sumptions of our disciplines appeared very
large indeed.
Has the gap been narrowed in the intervening
30 years? A search through some introductory
textbooks in economics indicates that if there
has been any change,it has not yet￿ ltered down
to that level: the same assumptions are still in
place as the cornerstones of economic analysis.
However, a behavioral approach to economics
has emerged in which the assumptions are not
held sacrosanct. In the following I comment
selectively on the developments with regard to
the three assumptions, on both sides of the
disciplinary divide.
I. Sel￿ shness
The clearest progress has occurred in correct-
ing and elaborating the assumption of sel￿ sh-
ness, and the progress has come entirely from
developments in economics, where the inven-
tion of the ultimatum game (Werner Guth et al.,
1982) had a great impact. Experiments con-
ducted in low-income countriesby investigators
armed with dollars con￿rmed conclusively that
quite a few people will forgo a substantial sum
for the sole bene￿t of denyinga larger sum to an
anonymous stranger who has treated them un-
generously (Lisa Cameron, 1999). Other evi-
dence indicates that offers that would be
rejected if they came from a person will be
accepted if they are generated by a computer.
Brain-imaging studies of people playing games
of trust and reciprocation have begun to appear
(Kevin McCabe et al., 2001), and they con￿rm
the signi￿cance of these games as social situa-
tions, in which behavior is determined to a
substantial extent by motives other than pro￿t.
A considerable amount of evidence, drawn
from two-person games and from public-goods
experiments, suggeststhat many people, at least
in the Western culture, start out trusting and
benevolent and reciprocate both good and bad
behaviors. This propensity for reciprocity has
been studied both empirically and theoretically
(Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter, 2000). Many
people also have a propensityto punish, even at
some costs to themselves, misbehaviors of one
stranger toward another stranger. An important
theoretical discovery is that the presence of a
suf￿ cient number of individualswith these mo-
tives in a population will turn individuals who
do not have the same motives into apparent
cooperators (Fehr et al., 2002).
The experimental and theoretical studies of
sel￿shness that some economists have con-
ducted represent a general advance for social
science. They also represent a signi￿cant move
in economics, beyond the model of economic
agents that Amartya Sen (1977) famously la-
beled “rational fools.” Some of the agents in
Fehr’s models are “opportunistic with guile”
(Oliver Williamson, 1985), but their behavior is
strongly constrained by the fact that they are
compelled to interact with people who care
about being treated fairly and are willing to do
something about it.
II. Rationality
No one ever seriously believedthat all people
have rational beliefs and make rational deci-
sions all the time. The assumption of rationality
is generally understood to be an approximation,
which is made in the belief (or hope) that de-
partures from rationality are rare when the
stakes are signi￿cant, or that they will disappear
under the disciplineof the market. This belief is
not shared by everyone: some economists have
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from rationality do not matter (e.g., George
Akerlof and Janet Yellen, 1985) and the idea
that arbitrageurs will drive irrationality out of
the marketplace (Andrei Shleifer, 2000). Their
position, if accepted, increases the relevance of
nonrational behavior in economic analysis.
The standard of rationalityin economicswas,
and remains, the maximization of subjective
expectedutility—a combinationofvonNeumann-
Morgenstern preferences and a Bayesian belief
structure. There have been important challenges
to this de￿ nition of rationality. Both Maurice
Allais (1953) and Daniel Ellsberg (1961) dem-
onstrated preferences that violate expected-
utility theory but have considerable normative
appeal. A rich literature has developed in at-
tempts to formulate a theory of rational choice
that will legitimize the Allais and Ellsberg pat-
terns of preferences. Herbert Simon (1955)
introduced the concepts of satis￿cing and
boundedrationality,which can be interpreted as
de￿ning a realistic normative standard for an
organism with a ￿ nite mind.
In the mid-1980’s Amos Tversky and I artic-
ulated a direct challenge to the rationality
assumption itself, based on experimental dem-
onstrations in which preferences were affected
predictably by the framing of decision prob-
lems, or by the procedure used to elicit prefer-
ences (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). We
argued that the demonstrated susceptibility of
peopleto framing effects violatesa fundamental
assumption of invariance, which has also been
labeledextensionality(Kenneth J. Arrow, 1982)
and consequentialism(Peter J. Hammond, 1989).
Unlike the paradoxes of expected-utilitytheory,
violations of invariance cannot be defended as
normative.Furthermore, these violationsare not
restricted to the laboratory. The labeling of
taxes is an obvious example of framing (Ed J.
McCaffery, 1994).The power of defaultoptions
is another. Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F.
Shea (2001) reported that the enrollment rate in
401(k) plans is close to 100 percent when en-
rollmentis automatic,but if actionis required to
enroll, only about half the employees will join
the plan within their ￿ rst year of employment.
The cost of the activity is hardly suf￿ cient to
rationalize this behavior.
The various questions that have been raised
about the rationality assumption appear to have
legitimized and encouraged the development of
economic theories that model departures from
economic rationality in speci￿c contexts. There
have been quite a few of those, including the
following:
(i) a stock market in which all traders
believe they are above average (Ter-
rance Odean, 1998);
(ii) a stock market in which traders are
myopic and loss-averse (Shlomo Ben-
artzi and Richard Thaler, 1995);
(iii) a market in which traders are too
quick to jump to conclusions (Matthew
Rabin, 2003);
(iv) models in which discounting is quasi-
hyperbolic (David Laibson, 1997);
(v) models in which self-control is an
acknowledged problem (Thaler and
Hersh Shefrin, 1981).
But the rationality model continues to provide
the basic framework even for these models, in
which the agents are “fully rational, except
for ...” some particular deviation that explains a
family of anomalies.
III. Unchanging Tastes and the Carriers
of Utility
Economists are thoroughly habituated to the
sight of indifference maps, but for someone
who has been trained as a psychologistthey can
be a source of puzzlement. It took me a long
time to realize that the representation looked
odd because I kept looking for an indication of
the individual’s current position in the map.
There is no such indication, of course, because
this parameteris supposedto be irrelevant: pref-
erences for ￿ nal states of endowment are as-
sumed to be stable over variations of current
endowment. This assumption, called reference-
independence by Tversky and Kahneman (1991)
is the interpretation of unchanging tastes with
which I am concerned here. As I will show
below, reference-independence can also be
viewed as an aspect of rationality.
The assumption of reference-independence
(or, equivalently, the idea that ￿ nal states of
endowment are the carriers of utility) has a long
history in the theoretical analysis of decision-
making under risk. Modern decision theory
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essay in which Daniel Bernoulli (1738) formu-
lated the original version of expected-utility
theory. Bernoulli’s decision-maker values ￿ -
nancial outcomes as states of wealth and orders
options by the expected utility of these states.
The model incorporates an assumption of ￿ xed
tastes, because the utility of states of wealth
does not depend on current endowment. This
assumption has been retained in all subsequent
versions of expected-utility theory.
An important article by Matthew Rabin
(2000;see also Rabin and Thaler, 2001)showed
that attitudesto wealth cannotexplain the levels
of risk aversion observed when the stakes are
low. Rabin developed a method that permits
inferences of the following kind (Rabin and
Thaler, 2001p. 222): “Suppose,for instance,we
know that a risk-averse person turns down
50-50 lose-$100-or-gain-$105 bets for any life-
time wealth level less than (say) $350,000, but
know nothing about his or her utility function for
wealthlevelsabove$350,000,exceptthatit is not
convex. Then we know that from an initial
wealth level of $340,000 the person will turn
down a 50-50 bet of losing $4,000 and gaining
$635,670.” Most people will reject the small
bet, and most will ￿ nd it absurd to reject the
large bet. Attitudes to wealth cannot explain
these preferences.
If Bernoulli’s formulation is so transparently
incorrect as a descriptive model, why has it
been retained for so long? The answer may well
be that the assignment of utility to wealth is an
aspect of rationality. The following thought ex-
periment illustrates the point.
Two persons get their monthly report
from a broker:
A is told that her wealth went from
4M to 3M;
B is told that her wealth went from
1M to 1.1M.
Which of the two individuals has more
reason to be satis￿ed with her ￿nancial
situation?
Who is happier today?
In Bernoulli’s analysis only the ￿ rst of
these questions is relevant, and only the long-
term consequences matter. The wealth frame
￿ ts a standard of mature reasonableness. But
a theory of choice that completely neglects
the short-term emotions associated with gains
and losses is bound to be psychologically
unrealistic.
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979) was offered as a descriptive model of
risky choice in which the carriers of utility are
not states of wealth, but gains and losses rela-
tive to a neutral reference point.
1 The most
distinctivepredictionsof the theory arise from a
property of preferences called loss-aversion:
the response to losses is consistentlymuch more
intense than the response to corresponding
gains, with a sharp kink in the value function
at the reference point. Unlike a reasonable
Bernoulli agent, a loss-averse decision-maker
will always reject a single 50-50 bet to lose
$100 or win $105. Estimates of the coef￿cient
of loss aversion (the ratio of slopes in the neg-
ative and positivedomains) convergeon a value
of about 2 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
The idea of loss-aversion was ￿ rst extended
to riskless choice by Thaler (1980), who used it
to explain the endowment effect—the now well-
documented discrepancy between willingness-
to-pay and willingness-to-accept for the same
good. Other implications were explored by
Kahneman et al. (1991) and by Tversky and
Kahneman (1991), and in several sources
collected by Kahneman and Tversky (2000).
Reference-dependence and loss-aversion are
both involved in the sharp distinction that most
people draw between opportunity costs and
losses. Among many other phenomena, the rel-
ative neglect of opportunity costs explains
target-income behavior by New York cab driv-
ers, who stop work earlier on rainy days, when
their opportunities are best (Colin Camerer et
al., 1997). Loss-aversion contributes to sticki-
ness in markets, because loss-averse agents
are much less prone to exchanges than ￿ nal-
states agents. In experiments in which some
randomly chosen participants were endowed
with a consumption good and allowed to trade
it, the volume of trade was about half of the
amount expected from standard economic the-
ory (Kahneman et al., 1990). Loss-aversion for
1 Habit-formation models incorporate similar ideas, in a
format that many economists will ￿nd more congenial.
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exchanges of money tokens in the same institu-
tion conformed quite precisely to the standard
analysis. Not all exchanges involve loss-
aversion. For example, there is little reluctance
to trade a ￿ ve-dollar bill for ￿ ve singles, and
aversion to giving up goods is unlikely to
affect the merchant who exchanges a pair of
shoes for cash (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991).
But the drying up of sales in real-estate mar-
kets that have experienced declining prices
illustrates an unwillingness to accept losses
relative to an existing reference price (David
Genesove and Christopher Mayer, 2001). The
boundary conditions for loss-aversion are yet
to be delineated with precision (Ian Bateman
et al., 1997).
The rules of fairness that embodya regard for
loss-aversion also induce stickiness in markets.
For example, cutting the wage of an employee
is considered unfair even when the employee
could easily be replaced at a lower pay. In
general, imposing losses on others is considered
unfair under conditions where failing to share
gains is entirely acceptable (Kahneman et al.,
1986). The asymmetry between losses and fore-
gone gains is recognized in many aspects of
the law (David Cohen and Jack L. Knetsch,
1992).
Adaptation and the consequent shift in the
reference point that separates gains from losses
have been interpreted here as a common form of
taste change. The ability of a decision-maker to
anticipate such changes in tastes is an essential
but often neglected aspect of rationality (James
March, 1978).Reviewingthe relevantliterature,
George Loewenstein and David Schkade(1999)
concluded that people generally underestimate
the extent of hedonic adaptation to new states.
Hedonic and affective forecasts are susceptible
to a substantial duration bias (Daniel Gilbert et
al., 1998). Assistant professors, for example,
greatly overestimate the effects of a tenure de-
cision on their happiness a year later (Gilbert
and Wilson, 2000). Failures of hedonic predic-
tion are even common in the short term. The
participants in a study reported by Kahneman
and Jackie Snell (1992) showed little ability to
anticipate how their enjoyment of a piece of
music or a helping of their favorite ice cream
would change over a period of eight daily epi-
sodes of consumption. Loewenstein and Daniel
Adler (1995) showed that participants in an
experiment underestimated the price that they
would demand to part from an object, if they
were asked the question before actually taking
possession of it.
The evidence of grave de￿ciencies in taste
prediction appears to pose a signi￿cant chal-
lenge to many applicationsof the rational-agent
model. In particular, it is dif￿ cult to reconcile
this evidence with the extraordinary feats of
hedonic prediction that are assumed in theories
that assume the rationality of the choice to be-
come addicted (Gary Becker and Kevin Mur-
phy, 1988). Perhaps more than any other, the
rational-addiction model highlights the large
gap that persists between the criteria of reason-
ableness that are applied to views of human
motivation in the disciplines of economics and
psychology.
An increased willingness of economists to
consider subjective data is a salient develop-
ment of recent years. The many applications of
measures of happiness in economic research
reviewed by Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer
(2002) included their own studies of the effects
of democratic institutions, as well as research
by others on the effects of in￿ation and unem-
ployment (Alberto Alesina et al., 2001). An
interest in the experienced utility of outcomes
(Kahneman et al., 1997) is a natural side-effect
of the willingness to consider agents who are
less than fully rational. If these agents do not
necessarily maximize the quality of their out-
comes, then choiceis no longer the sole relevant
measure of utility. This idea, if accepted, could
have implications for many domains of eco-
nomic analysis.
IV. Will the Gap Close Further?
Much has happened in the conversation be-
tween economics and psychology over the last
25 years. The church of economicshas admitted
and even rewarded some scholars who would
have been considered heretics in earlier periods,
and conventional economic analysis is now be-
ing done with assumptions that are often much
more psychologicallyplausible than was true in
the past. However, the analytical methodology
of economics is stable, and it will inevitably
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plines. Whether or not psychologists ￿ nd them
odd and overly simple, the standard assump-
tions about the economic agent are in economic
theory for a reason: they allow for tractable
analysis. The constraint of tractability can be
satis￿ ed with somewhat more complex models,
but the number of parameters that can be added
is small. One consequence is that the models of
behavioral economics cannot stray too far from
the original set of assumptions. Another con-
sequence is that theoretical innovations in
behavioral economics may be destined to be
noncumulative:when a new model is developed
to account for an anomaly of the basic theory,
the parameters that were modi￿ed in earlier
models will often be restored to their original
settings.Thus, it now appears likelythat the gap
between the views in the two disciplines has
been permanently narrowed, but there are no
immediateprospects of economicsand psychol-
ogy sharing a common theory of human
behavior.
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